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THE  FUTURE  FINANCING  OF  THE  COMMUNITY 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  The  European  Community  is  financed  by  resources 
which  accrue  to  it  as  of  right  and  as  a  direct  conse-
quence  of  its  own  policies.  The  current  own  resources 
system,  consisting  of  agricultural  and  sugar  levies, 
customs  duties  and  an  element  of  Value  Added  Tax 
of  up  to  1%  of  a  uniform  base,  has  served  the  Com-
munity  well  for  twelve  years.  But  the  time  has  now 
come  to  consider  its  further  development.  In  this 
present  communication  the  Commission  sets  out  some 
preliminary  ideas  on  how  this  development  might 
take  place.  The  character  of  this  communication 
is  that  of  a  discussion  document,  of  a  kind  which 
is  sometimes  referred  to  as  a  "green  paper".  It 
describes  various  considerations  affecting  the  deve-
lopment  of  the  Community's  financing  system  and 
lists  a  certain  number  of  options  which,  at  this 
stage  of  the  Commission's  reflections,  seem  prima 
facie  suitable  for  further  study.  It  does  not, 
deliberately,  contain  specific  proposals.  The  Commis-
sion  will  make  such  proposals,  in  the  spring  of 
1983,  in  the  light  of  its  further  internal  considera-
tions  of  the  issues  involved  and  of  the  reactions 
of  the  Council  and  of  the  Parliament  to  this  communi-
cation. 2 
2.  This  discussion  document  on  the  Community's 
financing  system  is  presented  to  the  Council  and 
the  Parliament  in  parallel  with  the  speech  which 
the  President  of  the  Commission  will  make  before 
the  Parliament  on  8  February  in  which  the  Commission's 
policy  priorities  for  the  remainder  of  its  Mandate 
will  be  set  out.  The  Commission's  ideas  on  the  Commun-
ity's  financing  system  need  to  be  appreciated  in 
the  light  of  its  policy  proposals.  The  Commission 
also  emphasizes,  at  it has  done  on  previous  occasions, 
that  the  Corr.munity's  budget,  with  the  financing 
of  which  this  "green  paper"  is  concerned,  gives 
only  a  very  partial  picture  of  the  reality  of  the 
Community  and  cannot  in  any  sense  constitute  the 
only,  or  even  the  principal, touchstone  by  which 
the  advantages  of  Community  membership  can  be  judged. 
3.  The  Commission's  proposals  ·for  the 
future  financin1z  of  the  Community  will  be  designed 
to: 
(a)  provide  the  Commuriity  with  the  necessary  resources 
and  with  the  necessary  financial  fl~xibility 
<:1nd  autonomy 
tary  demands 
to.  respond  to  the 
of  its  policies; 
increasing  budge-
(b)  develop  the  Community's  financing  system  in 
such  a  way  as  to  stimulate  the  further  development 
of  these,  and  new,  policies; - 3  -
(c)  establish  a  financial  framework  which  allows 
enlargement  by  S~ain  and  Portugal  to  take  place 
without  prejudice  to  the  acquis  communautaire 
as  it  now  exists  and  as  the  Commission  has  proposed 
it should  be  developed  in  the  context  of  enlargement; 
(d)  reinforce  the  Community's  internal  cohesion  by 
contributing  to  the  correction  of  budgetary  im-
balances,  as  demanded  in  various  resolutions 
of  the  European  Parliament. 
4.  The  Commission  has  on  a  number  of  occasions  explained 
why  it believes  an  extension  of  the  Community's  own 
resources  to  be  necessary  and  why  it cannot  accept 
that  the  present  ceiling  should  constitute  a  permanent 
constraint  upon  the  growth  of  the  Community's  budget. 
In  his  programme  speech  of  February  1981  to  the  European 
Parliament  the  President  of  the  Commission  emphasized 
that  the  Community  could  not  remain  simply  a  Community 
of  one  percent.  In  the  first  place,  this  is  because 
of  the  need  to  safeguard  the  maintenance  of  the  full 
range  of  the  Community's  existing  policies.  The 
Community  is  already  liying  in  the  shadow  of  the 
exhaustion  of  its  current  financial  resources;  and 
whatever  the  actual  level  of  expenditure  envisaged 
for  any  budget  year,  the  Community  needs  to  have 
in  reserve  a  certain  margin  of  potentially  available 
resources  so  as  to  safeguard,  within  an  overall  budgetary 
framework,  the  security  and  continuity  of all  its 
policies. - 4  -
5.  In  addition,  the  existing  range  of  Community 
policies  needs  to  be  developed  further.  The  Commission 
presented  ideas  for  the  development  of  Community 
policies  in  its  Mandate  Report  and  will  amplify 
and  extend  these  in  the  Programme  Speech  which  its 
President  will  deliver  to  the  European  Parliament 
on  8  February  1983.  In  brief,  the  Commission  envi-
sages: 
(a)  the  intensification  of  the  Community's  energy 
and  industrial  strategy  and  the  expansion  of 
Community  expenditure  on  research  and  development 
and  on  innovation  projects; 
(b)  more  systematic  and  extensive  use  of  Community 
financed  structural  expenditure  through  the 
Regional  and  Social  Funds,  as  well  as  the  develop-
ment  of  other  structural  expenditure  such  as 
FEOGA  Guidance  and  Fisheries  and  Mediterranean 
programmes; 
(c)  the  development  of  a  substantial  Community  finan-
ced  transport  infrastructure  programme; 
(d)  the  achievement  within  the  next  ten  years  of 
a  Community  development  aid  programme  representing 
1/1000  of  the  Community's  Gross  Domestic  Product; 
(e)  the  maintenance  of  the  Commission's  aim,  which 
is  that  agricultural  expenditure  should  grow 
more  slowly  than  the  Community's  own  resources 
assessed  over  a  period  of  several  years. 5  -
6.  In  assessing  the  contribution  which  particular 
forms  of  new  resource  can  make  to  the  attainment  of 
the  objectives  set  out  in  paragraph  3  above  the  Co~­
mission  starts  from  the  premise  that  the  development 
of  the  Com m  u rti t y ' s  fin an  c in  g  system  must  be  viewed 
in  connection  with  the  development  of  the  Community's 
policies,  particularly  its  expenditure  policies. 
The  Commission  has  long  emphasized  the  need  to  expand 
the  Community's  policies  in  the  non-agricultural  area 
and  the  effect  of  this  would  be  to  produce  a  better 
b a l a n c e  o f  t: x p e n d i t u t' e  w i t h i n  t h e  C  o m  m  u n i t y  I3 u d g e t  . 
In  this  context,  the  Commission  regrets  that,  as  a 
result  of  the  current  stagnation  of  Community  deci-
sions  in  many  areas,  the  relationship  between  the 
development  of  national  and  Community  policies  is 
not  moving  as  expected  in  favour  of  Community  pro-
era  r~me  s .. 
7.  In  making  these  proposals,  the  Commission  docs 
not  proceed  f1·om  the  assumption  that  an  increase  in 
the  s i z e  of  the  Co 111  n1 u n i t y ' s  b u cl g c t  i s  d c sir  able  s i m  ply 
f  o r  i  t  s  o w n  s a k e  •  T h e  C u m  m i  s s i  o n  r  e c o g n i  z c s  t  h u~ s e v e r  e 
economic  constraints  facing  all  its  member  states 
and  has  itself emphasized  the  in1porl<:illCe  of  budgetary 
discipline  in  Lhe  public  sector.  All  expenditure 
at  Community  level  should  be  rigorously  scrutinized 
with  a  vie11.·  to  shov1ing  that it rc:presents  i1  cost-effect-
ive  alternative  to  national  progrc.trnrncs.  Indeed,  ir1  the 
Cornrnissi.on's  view  the  relationship  LeLween  Community 
e x p c n d i  t  u r  c:  a n d  t  h a t  o f  n a t  i  o n a l 
in  ccrt<Jin  appropriate  cuses  be 
ex''  m i n c cl  '' n d  pub l  i  c  i  s c d . 
govc!'nrnents  could 
more  systcrnuticc.tlly G 
1' he  ti i  g 11  i  f  i c d  n c e  of  e con  om i  l~ s  of  s cal c  needs  to  b c 
In  particular,  in  the  field 
of  policies  designed  to  promote  structural  adjustment 
as  well  as  industrial  and  technological  innovation, 
purely  IIatioiia1  programmes  entirely  financed  by  nation-
al  budgets  risk  in  many  cases  not  to  be  adequate  be-
cause  of  budgetary  restrictions  and  limitations  of 
scale.  A  higher  level  of  Community  financing  can 
in  some  cases  not  only  avoid  the  waste  of  scarce  public 
rcsource~:i  but  also  provide  an  incentive  for  greate1~ 
o p e n  i.  n E  o f  t  h e  m a l'  k e t  .  It  should  be  possible  to  show 
the  p eo  p 1 e  of  Europe  that  any  increase  in  the  Co  111  n1 u n i  -
ty
1 s  resources  ~>hou1cl  not  automatically  involve  an 
additional  burden  on  the  European  taxpayer;  on  the 
contrary,  in  many  cases  the  corollary  of  increased 
Community  expenditure  should  be  a  reduction  in  expendi-
ture  at  tl1e  nati onaJ  level. 
8 .  T h e r  e  a r e  n o  p o t e n t  i  a 1  a d d i  t  i o n a l  n e w  f o r  r.1 s  o f 
r  e v c n u c  • ''  v a i  l  a b 1 e  t o  t  h e  C o m  m u n i  t  y  VI h i  c h  f  1 o VI  a s  a u t  o m CJ-
t  i  c a 1 l  y  f  r· u m  i  t  s  p o l  i  c i  e s  a s  d o  t h e  t  r  a d i  t  i  o n a l  o 111 n 
r  e  ~' o u r c e s  o f  c u s t  o m  s  d u t  i  e s  a n cl  a g r  i  c u l  t  u r a l  l  e v i  c s  . 
T h c  C om i  s s  i  o n  h  a~.  1 h c r e f  o r e  s o u g h t  to  i  cl e n t  i  f y  t h o ~; e 
n e w  r (' ~;our·  c c s  w h i  c h  h c s  t  l' c f  l e c t  the  over  a l  l  i  11  t  c r  c s  t 
o f  t h e  C o 111  rr1  u  ~1 i  t  y  ,  111 h i  c h  e n h a n c e  t h c  a t  t r  a c t  i  o n  for 
a l  l  Member  States  of  full  participation  in 
.~ 
Cor;, m u n i  t  y 
p o l  i  c i  e s  a n J  w h i c h  b e '; t  c n s u r· c  a  c o h c r  e n t  r' e 1 "  t  i o n s h i p 
bet  111  c c n  L. he  Co  111  rn  u n i  t  y  1 s  rev c n u c s  and  i  t  s  putt  c r  n  of 
expenditure. 
9  .  I n  o r' d c r  t  o  a l  J o w  t  h e  cl  c v e 1 o p rn e n t  o f  t  l1 e  C o rn m u n i  -
ty'._.  prL·c.cn·t  poli.cic"c;  to  be  lllclinlaiiJed  v.•ith  Zlll  ddcq\:cJt(' 
Iii Z\ r  ); i  ll  0  f' 
\'1  j  l ]  lJ ('  ncrcucd  ill  1.]1('  fullll'C' 1  l!lC]Uding  lli  tile  CCJ!l·~ 
8  lJc·  Lcl'  divt·J·~;if'jcd  ~;y~_;Lcrll  of  fjniJnc1c1l  r·c·~)uur·cc~~ 
i  c;  1 • (· q u i  r  c:  cJ  • - '!  -
10.  Such  a  diversification  would  also  contribute 
to  the  mitigation  of  the  budgetary  problems  to  which 
the  Commission  referred  in  the  Introduction  to  its 
Preliminary  Draft  Supplementary  Budget  N°  1  1983, 
and  for  which  the  European  Parliament  in  its  Resolu-
tion  of  16  December  1982  called  for  a  lasting  Commu-
nity  solution*.  The  Commission  made  clear  that  it 
was  alive  to  the  concern  expressed  by  Parliament 
and  to  its  desire  to  see  the  ad  hoc  solutions  of 
recent  years  replaced  by  a  permanent  arrangement 
for  strengthening  Community  policies  and  would  accord-
ingly  be  presenting  proposals  in  the  near  future 
for  developing  these  policies  and  for  introducing 
a  more  diversified  system  of  own  resources. 
11.  A  further  factor  which  has  intervened  in  the 
years  since  the  establishment  of  the  current  own 
resources  system,  is  the  emergence  of  a  directly 
elected  European  Parliament.  The  Parliament's  role 
as  part  of  the  Budget  Authority  is  clearly  defined 
in  the  Treaty.  In  the  Commission's  view,  it is  essen-
tial  that  in  any  further  renewal  of  the  system  proper 
provision  should  be  made  for  the  exercise  by  the 
directly  elected  European  Parliament  of  budgetary 
powers  and  responsibilities  which  adequately  refect 
its  status. 
*  In  its  resolution  of  16  December  1982,  the  European 
Parliament  called  on  the  Commission  and  the  Council 
"to  submit  as  soon  as  possible  new  financial  and 
budgetary  proposals  which  provide  an  effective  follow-
-up  to  the  Mandate  of  30  May  and  lay  the  basis  for 
a  lasting  Community  solution  to  the  unacceptable 
situations  which  have  arisen  for  a  number  of  Member 
States". - 8  -
12.  The  following  paragraphs  discuss,  successively, 
possible  sources  of  general  revenue  for  financing 
the  Community  Buclr,et,  under  the  headings  of  VAT,  progressivity 
and  sources  of  revenue  related  to  agricuLtural  indicators;  possible 
sources  of  revenue  related  to  the  financing  of  specific 
policies;  revenues  which  accrue  incidentally  as 
the  consequence  of  the  Community's  agricultural 
and  commercial  policies;  the  role  of  borrowing  and 
lending;  the  f1 asibility  of  the  introduction  of 
some  kind  of  financial  equalisation  or  transfer 
system;  and  the  role  of  Parliament.  Annexes  to  this 
communication  is  a  brief  commentary  on  certain  other 
financinr,  ideas  which  the  Cornmi~;sion  has  examined 
but  which  do  not  seem,  in  present  circumstances, 
to  be  feasible  as  Community  resources;  a  fuller 
analysis  of  the  idea  of  financial  equalisation; 
an d  a  d i  s c u ~; f3  i  o n  o f  t  11 c  i  n t  e g r i  t  y  a n d  a u t o n o m  y  o f 
the  Community  budget. 
1 3 .  In  s c t t  i n g  out  these  i  d cas  for  a  d i  v c r s i f i c <t Lion 
of  the  Con,munity's  finuncing  sy~;tem,  the  Commission 
~; t a r  t  s  f r o m  t h c  a s s u Iii p t i  o n  t h a t  t  h e  e x i  s t  i  n g  r  y-o g e 
of  o'wn  resources  will  rcm·ain  intact;  and  that  any 
new  forms  of  revenue  would  constitute  an  addition - 9  -
SOURCES  OF  GENERAL  REVENUE 
VALUE  ADDED  TAX 
14.  Of  all  the  possible  sources  of  additional 
general  revenue  for  the  Community  Budget  Value  Added 
Tax  has  obvious  attractions.  It  is  an  existing  own 
resource  capable  of  being  linked  directly  to  the 
taxpayer.  In  principle  the  tax  base  is  already  har-
monized.  The  necessary  mechanisms  for  assessment, 
payment  and  control  are  in  place,  work  relatively 
well  and  ensure  a  large  measure  of  continuity  in 
financing  the  Community's  budget  expenditure.  More-
over,  VAT  is  levied  on  consumption  and  thus  offers 
a  very  large  reliable  base,  generating  high  revenue 
from  a  low  tax  rate.  These  revenues  are  adequately 
buoyant.  For  the  Community  as  a  whole,  the  VAT  base 
can  be  expected  to  grow  over  time  more  or  less  in 
proportion  to  Community  GOP.  Finally  because  of 
the  mechanism  whereby  VAT  taxpayers  must  deduct 
tax  already  paid  in  order  to  arrive  at  their  own 
net  VAT  bill,  VAT  enjoys  an  element  of  self-checking: 
it is  thus  to  some  degree  less  subject  to  evasion 
than  other  broadly  based  tax  options.  Thus  the 
increase  or  removal  of  the  1%  ceiling  would  provide 
a  durable  and  reliable  source  of  revenue  which  would 
be  capable  of  assuring  a  considerable  development 
of  Community  policies.  It also  roughly  reflects 
the  relative  wealth  of  the  Community's  Member  States. - 10  -
15.  Further  measures  are  still required  to  perfect 
the  development  of  the  VAT  system  so  as  to  enable 
it better  to  correspond  to  the  original  ideal  of 
a  direct  relationship  between  the  taxpayer  and  the 
Community.  For  example,  although  the  VAT  base  is 
harmonized  in  principle,  Member  States  currently 
enjoy  a  variety  of  temporary  derogations  from  it 
which  have  to  be  compensated  by  financial  payments 
based  on  approximate  calculations  of  the  tax  which 
would  have  been  due.  Moreover,  under  transitional 
arrangements  VAT  is  not  perceived  directly  from 
individual  taxpayers  but  on  the  basis  of  a  weighted 
average  involving  a  considerable  degree  of statis-
tical  estimation  applied  to  the  total  revenue 
collected.  The  Commission  will  maintain  and  reinforce 
its  efforts  to  secure  the  complete  phasing  out  of 
those  transitional  anomalies.  It  is  VAT  which  should, 
in  the  Commission's  view,  remain  for  the  foreseeable 
future  as  the  backbone  of  the  Community's  financial 
autonomy.  The  Commission  envisages  therefore  that, 
as  the  Community  develops  a  fuller  range  of  expendi-
ture  policies  additional  VAT  revenues  beyond  the 
1%  ceiling will  be  necessary,  together  with  a  more 
diversified  system  of  Community  financing. -----------------
- 11  -
PROGRESSIVITY 
16.  The  Commission  has  examined  the  desirability 
and  feasibility  of  introducing  an  element  of  progres-
sivity  into  the  Community's  revenue  system.  The 
introduction  of  such  a  concept  would  be  consonant 
with  the  notion  of  equity  which  is  basic  to  all 
public  financing  systems.  The  political  purpose 
of  its  introduction  into  the  financing  of  the  Commun-
ity  Budget  would  be  to  contribute,  in  a  modest  way, 
to  the  convergence  of  Member  States'  economies  by 
ensuring  that  each  Member  State's  liability  for 
payments  into  the  Community  Budget  was  modulated 
either  upwards  or  downwards  in  relation  to  that 
Member  State's  level  of  prosperity.  It  would  mean 
that  those  Member  States  with  an  above-average  wealth 
(measured  most  conveniently  by  GOP  per  capita)  would 
have  an  increased  requirement  for  revenue  contribu-
tions  whereas  less  prosperous  Member  States  would 
be  relieved.  There  are  two  broad  ways  of  introducing 
progressivity  into  the  Community  financing  system; 
either  an  element  of  progressivity  could  be  added 
into  the  VAT  system;  or  Member  States  could  be  pro-
gressively  taxed  on  the  basis  of  GOP. 
17.  The  addition  of  an  element  of  progressivity 
into  the  VAT  system  would  mean  the  application  of 
a  corrective  mechanism  to  the  calculation  of  the 
VAT  rate,  which  follows  immediately  after  the  adoption 
of  the  budget.  Such  a  mechanism  could  take  two  forms: - 12  -
a  correction  of  VAT  in  function  of  the  per  capita 
GDP  of  each  of  the  Member  States  as  a  percentage 
of  the  Community  average.  This  would  mean  that 
each  Member  State  would  be  allocated  its  own  VAT 
rate  and  that  the  actual  rate  applied  would  differ 
from  one  Member  State  to  another; 
a  correction  of  the  VAT  rate  in  favour  of  certain 
Member  States  only  (e.g.  a  rate  reduction  in  favour 
of  those  whose  GDP  per  capita  fell  below  the  Commun-
ity  average).  This  mechanism  would  be  similar 
to  that  which  is  at  present  applied,  on  a  transi-
tional  basis,  to  Greece. 
18.  Both  these  methods  of  applying  a  corrective 
mechanism  to  VAT,  neither  of  which  has  any  counterpart 
in  existing  national  VAT  legislation,  would  require 
amendment  to  the  existing  own  resources  legislation, 
and  both  would  further  stretch  the  tenuous  link 
between  the  VAT  taxpayer  and  the  Community.  The 
replacement  of  a  single  VAT  rate  by  ten  different 
rates  would  be  a  major  innovation  which  would  change 
significantly  the  character  of  the  own  resources 
:;;ystem. 
19.  If it were  thought  preferable  to  introduce 
an  element  of  progressivity  without  weighting  the 
VAT  yield  in  this  way,  an  alternative  method  would 
be  to  include  in  the  Community's  revenues,  in  addition 
to  the  consumption  based  VAT,  another  source  of 
income  reflecting  directly  the  prosperity  of  Member 
States.  GDP  per  capita  is  widely  recognized  as  a 13  -
measure  of  prosperity  and  the  Community  has  made  ex-
plicit  use  of  it  for  some  years.  A  tax  on  Member 
States  based  on  GDP  could  be  ~adulated  in  a  progressive 
sense  by  the  application  of  a  coefficient  of  elasticity 
to  the  percentage  of  contribution  which  the  uncorrected 
relative  GDP  shares  would  represent.  Such  a  progress-
ive  GDP  tax  would  fulfil  more  directly  the  objective 
of  promoting  economic  convergence  in  the  Community 
by  relating liability  for  payment  to  capacity  to  pay; 
and  would  do  so  in  a  way  which  avoided  prejudice  to 
the  smooth  operation  and  further  development  of  the 
VAT  element  of  the  Community's  present  own  resources. 
20.  Although  a  progressive  GDP  tax  on  Member  States 
would  thus  have  a  number  of  attractive  characteristics 
as  a  source  of  general  revenue  it would  suffer  from 
one  significant  drawback:  it would  be  seen  as  a  par-
tial  return  to  the  system  of  financial  contributions 
which  applied  before  the  own 
1970  and  thus  as  a  political 
resources  decision  of 
step  backwards. 
21.  The  introduction  of  the  concept  of  progressivity 
whether  by  a  modulation  of  VAT  or  through  a  progressive 
GDP  tax,  would  pose  a  number  of  technical  and  political 
difficulties.  It  would  be  necessary  to  agree  upon 
how  the  progressive  indicators  of  taxable  capacity 
should  be  defined.  Moreover,  in  order  to  have  any 
significant  impact  upon  the  Community's  budgetary 
problems,  progressivity  would  have  to  be  introduced  on 
a  scale  far  in  excess  of  that  which  has  usually  been 
discussed  in  this  context  or  than  which  seems  realistic 
in  current  circumstances. 111 
SOUHCE~~  OF  HEVENUE  HF:LATED  TO  AGHlCULTUHAL  lN!JJCATOHS 
22.  A[',ricultural  policy,  the  only  [JOlicy  actuc.llly 
inte[',rated,  accouJJts  for  a  large  slice  (around  6~%) 
of  the  Budget.  In  future  increasing  provision  will 
need  to  be  made  in  the  Budget  for  the  new  policies 
which  the  Community  will  have  to  introduce  and  to 
g i  v e  e f  f c c t  to  t  h e  for t h c o r;1 i n g  en l  a r r. e m e n t  .  !luring 
this  phase  of  eradual  diversification  it  would  be 
appropriate  for  a  new  type  of  resource,  drawn  from 
ttH::  whole  ecuJJorny  but  based  on  agricultural  parameters, 
to  b e  n cl d e cl  t  o  t  h e  p r  c s e n t  o w n  r· e s o u r  c c s  s y s t c m  s o 
as  to  bring  it  more  into  line  with  the  pattern  of 
expenditure.  The  introduction  of  such  a  new  type 
o f  r c s o u l'  c c  w o u 1 d  h a v e  the  further  ad  v an tag  e  o f  avo i  d --
in  g  ~3 i  t  u at  i  on::;  in  w h i  c h  d i  ~> c u  ~; s i on s  of  fin an c i  a l  pro b-
lerns  irnrof;c  Drtificial  con~otraints  into  the  norrn3l 
o p e r  3  t  f on  o f  t  h c:  C /1  I' -
'Z3.  The  pur~ose of  this  new  resources,  to  be 
Levied  from  the  Member  States,  would  be  to  contribute  .• 
to  thP  financi11g  of  the  \,•hole  of  the  Comrnunjt.y's  expcn-
d i  t u r e  ,  i  . c  .  i  t  w o u 1 d  n o t  b c  l  i. r: k e d  f: : ' e c i  f  i  c :1 ]  1 y  t o 
any  one  p3r't  of  the  budget;  but  it  \·:·.uld  be  based 
upon  indicators  of  an  agricultural  nature.  The  ::.ncorne 
fro  111  t  h i  ~-'  n c w  r  c: s  C.J u r  c c  w o u ] d  n e e d  to  lJ c  s u f  f  i  c  i  c· n t  l  y 
!; u b ~; t  <J n t. i a l  to  rn u k e  a  worth  v.' h i  l e  cont.  r  i  b u t  i  o 11  to  the 
mitieation  of  some  of  the  Community's  budget<JJ'Y  prob-
l  emf;_  }) u t  i  t  ~; h c• u l  d  b c  co  11 c '-'  i  v e d  il"  a  t  r  a 1 1 s  i  t. i  (l n a 1 15  -
gradual  reduction  in  its relative  ~ize,  and  eventually 
even  its  complete  disappearance,  in  parallel  with 
the  development  of  a  better  reflection  in  expend~tures of  the  various 
Community  prioritits  sug~ested by  the  President  in  his  8  February  speech. 
Amongst  the  hypotheses  which  might  be  envisaged,  the  size  of  the 
revenues  which  the  new  resources  should  generate  might  therefore  be  calculated 
in  such  a  way  as  to  correspond  to  the  amount  of  agricultural  expend-
iture  in  excess  of  a  certain  percentage  of  either 
the  total  budget  or  the  total  available  own  resources. 
24.  The  calculation  of  this  new  resource  could  be 
111  n d e  i n  a  n u n,IJ e r  o f  w  il  y s  i n  r e 1 a t  i on  to  M c m b e r  S t a t c  ~'  ' 
shares  in  the  Community's  overall  agricultural  pl'oduct-
ion.  The  elements  to  be  taken  into  consideration 
could  ir!clude,  for  illustr·ative  put'poses,  the  final 
or  added  value  of  agricultural  production  in  each 
M  c ''' b c r  State ,  t h c  v a 1 u e  of  production  u n d c r  reg  i me s 
b en e f i t  i  n g  fro m  p a l' t  i c u 1 a r  for m  s  o f  C  CJ  rn m  u n i t y  s u p p o r  t 
or  a  set of values  modulated  in  accordance  with  the 
nature  of  such  rep,imes.  Account  would  have  to  be 
taken  of  the  situation  of  certain  Member  States  ~nd 
their  r~gions  whose  general  level  of  prosperity  is 
1 ow  b u t  w h o s e  c c on  o rn i  e s  a r e  p a r t  i  c u l a r l y  d e p t: 1 1 d en t 
upon  aericulture. l(i  -
0 THE R  l'  0 S S J B L E  S 0 U n  C E S  0 F  GENE n A L  REVENUE 
25.  The  Commission  has  exan·incd  a  number  of  ideas 
for  otJ,cr  possible  sources  of  general  revenue.  For 
the  reasons  explained  in  Annex  I  none  seem  prima  facie 
suitab]<:  at  this  stage  as  a  Community  resource,  either 
b e c a u  ~; c  t  J  1 e  n  r~ c c f; s a r  y  t  a x  r  a t  e  i  s  i  n a d e q u a t  e l  y  h u !'  m o -
nizcd  or  bccuu~~e  t!Jc  economic  consequences  of  the 
i  rn p o s i  t  :i u n  o r  a  Co  111m u n i  t  y  tax  i n  the  are  a  con  c e r  11 e d 
w o u l  cl  u  e  u n j  u s t  .i  f  i  <J  b 1 y  d  CJ  111  a g i  n g  . 
REVENllES  I.INEED  TO  ~;PECIFIC  POLICIES 
26.  ] n  a deli tj on  to  its  general  revenues  it might  be 
advRntt,gE·ous  for  thl;  Comn,unity  to  dit;pose  of  certain 
rn  i n o r  :; o u I' c e s  o f  i n c o me  1 i  n k t' d  to  t  h e  d e v e 1 o p m  e n t 
o r  ~; p c c 1 r i  c  r [J 1 i  c i  e s  .  T h e  e x  <-" m  p 1 e  o f  t  h e  E u r o p l' d  n 
Co a 1  a 11 d  S t  c e l  Co  I'' rn  u n i  t  y  Bud g c t  h  <1  ~  ~; how n  that  u 11  cl e r 
certain  conditions  <,ncJ  up  to  a  certain  point  expendi-
turc  in  connection  with  policies  in  particular  sectors 
c a n  li a t  i  "; f  "' c t  o I' i  1 y  u c  f  i  n a n c e d  b y  ) c v  i e s  f  r  o rn  l h o ~' c 
s am s  :; c c i. o J' s  .  En c r 't'.Y  ,  res  c· arch  an  cl  in  cl us try  ~; u fl' c s t 
.~ 
lines  rnir,ht  be  fca,;ib1e.  T 11 c  C o 111 m i  s s  i  o n  i  s  n o L  -a t 
t  l 1 i s  ~; t  <.\  ['. c  t  l1  i  n k i  n g  i  n  t c r  111 s  o f  s p c c i  f  i  c  p r a c t  i  c 3  ] 
cases:  t  h i  s  i  ';  n o t  a'- 111 o d e  o f  f  i  n a n c i  n g  f o r  g c n c r a l 
u :c; e ,  a 11  c]  t  l1 l'  d e s i l'  iJ b i  1 i  t  y  o f  c m p l  o y i n E  i  t  t  o  f  u n d 
certain  i  t  c~ 111  ~.  of  expend i  t  u r  e  w o u l  d  h c:;  v e  to  be  "p  p r ;:Ji  :; c d 
c il  ~; c  by  c ''  ~; c·  il c cord i  11 g  to  the  part  i  c u ] c, r  f cat  u r c s 
prc:;CIJtcd  Lly  the  case  ccncerncd.  In  this  context,  it  would 
be  appropriate  to  decide  on  the  affectation  to  the  Community  of  the 
custon1s  duties  on  ECSC  rroducts. - 17  -
INCIDENTAL  REVENUES 
27.  The  Community  Budget  will  continue  to  benefit 
from  the  revenues  accruing  from  customs  duties, 
agricultural  levies  and  sugar  levies.  The  yield 
of  these  traditional  own  resources  is  substantial 
(currently  around  8.139  MECU  per  year)  but  fluctuates 
from  year  to  year  and  is  gradually  declining  in 
accordance  with  the  downward  trend  in  real  terms 
of  customs  duties.  Various  policy  changes  in  this 
field  could  produce  additional  revenues  in  the  future 
for  example  the  introduction  of  a  tax  on  cereal 
substitutes  or  of  a  tax  on  oils  and  fats.  The  justifi-
cation  of  such  taxes  in  terms  of  agricultural  policy 
is  not  dicussed  here.  But  neither  would  be  appro-
priate  as  a  source  of  regular  finance  for  the 
Community  Budget.  A  tax  on  cereal  substitutes  would 
have  a  low  yield  and  would  be  subject  to  unpredic-
table  fluctuations.  A  tax  on  oils  and  fats  would, 
if introduced,  be  geared  to  covering  expenditure 
necessary  to  maintain  the  level  of  olive  oil  consump-
tion. 
28.  Similarly  agricultural  co-responsibility  levies, 
though  they  can  yield  not  inconsiderable  amounts 
of  revenue  in  certain  years,  are  designed  as  tools 
of  agricultural  management,  not  as  primary  sources 
of  revenue.  The  basic  idea  behind  the  co-responsi-
bility  levy  as  it is  now  applied  in  the  milk  sector, 
is  to  contain  the  surpluses  above  the  production -- 18  -· 
target .by  making  the  producers  participate  finan-
cially  in  the  market  regulation  mechanisms.  So  far, 
this  levy  is  considered  as  an  earmarked  resource. 
In  the  interests  of  budget  transparency  it ought 
to  be  entred  in  the  budget  as  revenue.  The  resources 
accruing  from  the  co-responsibility  levy  depend 
on  the  'Lr<;nd  in  surplus  pl oducts,  und  they  there:fore 
drop  to  tte  extent  that  the  objectives  of  regulating 
the  agriciilt.ural  mst•kets  are  attained. 
THE  ROLE  OF  BORROWING  AND  LENDING 
29.  In  the  Commission's  view,  loans  cannot  substi-
tute  for  Community  own  resources.  On  the  other  hand, 
they  have  an  important  role  to  play  for  increasing 
the  Community's  participation  in  the  financing  of 
projects  which  corr~spond  to  the  objectives  of 
Community  policies.  In  fact  they  already  play  an 
important  role  in  the  financing  0f  sam£  ~olicies, 
a  role  which  should  be  develcped  further  in  the 
future.  The  devclopm2nt  of  this  role  can  be  facili-
t a t  e d  by  an  i n c r e a :;; e  i n  U; e  r  r~ s o u r  <.:  c s  o f  t  h ''  r: o ir. m  u n -
ity  since  the  budget  p~ovides guarantees  and  in 
some  clscs  interest  reb2tes  for  those  loans  which 
have  reached  a  subst~nti~l level. - 19  -
30.  On  15  November  1979,  the  European  Parliament 
adopted  a  Resolution  (the  Lange  Resolution)  on  the 
communication  from  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  entitled  "Convergence  and  Budgetary 
Questions".  This  Resolution  was  based  on  a  number 
of  considerations  which  remain  relevant  today  and 
set  out  various  basic  principles  of  European  finance. 
The  Resolution: 
- "considers  that  a  new  and  lasting  system  of  finan-
cial  equalisation  between  the  Member  States  within 
a  Community  framework  - based  on  the  concept 
of  per  capita  gross  domestic  product  and  organised 
within  the  framework  of  the  Community  Budget  -
can  effectively  contribute  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  efforts  at  convergence  made  through  the 
common  policies;" 
- "calls  on  the  Commission  to  draw  up  a  formal 
proposal  based  on  the  Community  system  of  equalisa-
tion  described  above  and  on  proposals  for  conver-
gence  between  the  economies." 
This  Resolution  was  followed  in  1981  by  a  Resolution 
on  the  Community's  own  resources  (the  Spinelli  Resolu-
tion)  which  stated  that  the  budget  should  have  a 
more  distributive  role  and  placed  the  emphasis  more 
on  the  modulation  of  resources  and  the  development 
of  stuctural  policies. - 20  -
31.  The  Commission  fully  agrees  with  Parliament 
as  regards  the  following  considerations  and  princi-
ples: 
"that  convergence  between  the  economies  can  result 
only  from  the  development  of  genuinely  common 
policies  and  from  the  coordination  of  the  policies 
pursued  by  the  Member  States  in  the  economic 
and  monetary  spheres,  and  also  in  the  regional, 
social,  agricultural  and  other  sectors;" 
- "that  the  financial  imbalances  which  characterize 
the  present  situation  and  the  burdens  which  they 
place  on  certain  Member  States  are  a  serious 
problem  which  calls  for  an  immediate  solution;" 
"that  it considers  'inadequate,  given  its  incompati-
bility  with  the  spirit  of  the  Treaties,  any 
solution  based  on  the  concept  of  a  fair  return, 
calling  into  question  the  principle  of  own 
resources  or  resorting  to  non-budgetary  financial 
transfers. '" 
32.  In  considering  the  possible  application  of 
a  financial  equalisation  system  to  the  Community, 
the  Commission  has  had  to  bear  in  mind  the  diferen-
ces  which  exist  between  the  Community  as  it is  today 
and  those  federal  states,  where  such  a  system 
operates.  Financial  equalisation  in  those  states 
involves  arrangements  on  both  the  revenue  and  expen-
diture  side,  designed  to  establish  a  unitary  level 
of  provision  of  certain  public  services.  As  regards 
the  Community's  revenues,  the  introduction  of  a 
better  diversified  financing  system  would  correspond 
with  some  of  the  objectives  of  financial  equalisation 
particularly  insofar  as  it  led  to  a  reduction  in - 21 
the  liability  for  contributing  revenue  of  the  Com-
munity's  less  prosperous  Member  States. 
33.  As  regards  the  Community's  expenditure,  it is 
clear  that  a  budget  accounting  for  scarcely  1%  of 
the  GOP  of  the  Community  obviously  cannot  bring  to 
bear  a  sufficient  volume  of  resources  to  impact  signi-
ficantly  upon  the  full  range  of  the  Community's  prob-
lems  of  regional  differences  and  economic  non-conver-
gence.  It  is  clear  too  that if  a  new  mechanism  were 
to  be  introduced  into  the  Community  Budget,  there 
would  have  to  be  adequate  guarantees  that  the  transfers 
paid  over  would  actually  promote  convergence.  This 
would  seem  automatically  to  rule  out  a  system  of  uncon-
ditional  transfers,  at  least  within  the  Community's 
current  institutional  framework. 
34.  A  form  of  equalisation  mechanism,  involving  trans-
fers  on  the  expenditure  side  additional  to  those  under 
the  Community's  structural  funds  could  nonetheless 
be  a  useful  new  element  in  the  Community's  budget. 
Such  a  mechanism  could  be  geared  to  two  purposes. 
It  could  provide  additional  financing  so  as  to  allow 
certain  Member  States  to  participate  more  fully  in 
economic  programmes  reflecting  agreed  Community  prio-
rities.  The  interest  rate  subsidies  disbursed  in  Ir~­
land  and  Italy  in  the  context  of  their  participation 
in  the  European  Monetary  System  are  an  illustration 
of  this  kind  of  possible  transfer.  Or  its  application 
could  be  limited  to  a  certain  number  of  the  least 
prosperous  Member  States.  The  resources  so  transferred 
would  need  to  be  subject  to  the  necessary  consistency 
w i t h  Com m  u n i t y  p o L  i  c i  e s  and  s u b j e c t  to  p r o p e r  Co llJITJ u n i  t  y 
control. - 22  -
35.  An  equalisation  mechanism  or  this  kind  would 
perhaps  be  more  politically  attainable  in  the  short 
term.  The  sums  required  for  its  operation  need  not 
be  excessively  large.  A  transfer  of  resources  limited 
in  overall  size  could  still  have  a  significant 
economic  effect  upon  the  least  prosperous  Member 
States  concerned. 
THE  ROLE  OF  PARLIAMENT 
36.  Any  new  development  OI  the  Community's  rinancing 
system  should,  in  the  Commision's  view,  reflect 
and  enhance  the  role  of  the  directly  elected  European 
Parliament  as  one  branch  of  the  budgetary  authority. 
37.  Article  201  or  the  EEC  Treaty  stipulates  that 
the  creation  or  new  own  resources  is  decided  by 
Council,  acting  unanimously  after  consulting  the 
European  Parliament,  and  subsequently  ratified  by 
the  Member  States.  The  Commission  proposed  in  1973 
an  amendment  to  this  Article,  designed  to  enable 
the  Institutions  of  the  Community  to  create  addition-
al  sources  of  revenues  without  having  to  obtain 
ratification  by  national  Parliaments.  This  proposal 
covered  three  points:  the  Commission  should  examine 
in  what  manner  new  revenues  could  be  raised;  in 
every  fifth  year  the  Council,  after  receiving  a 
report  from  the  Commission  and  consulting  the  Parlia-
ment,  should  examine  whether  and  in  what  manner 
new  revenues  should  be  introduced  for  the  Community; 
• - 23  -
finally,  the  Parliament  acting  on  a  proposal  of 
the  Commission  and  after  the  Council  had  given  its 
unanimous  assent,  might,  by  a  majority  of  its  members 
and  of  three-fifths  of  the  votes  cast,  amend  the 
upper  limit  for  existing  resources  or  make  provisions 
for  new  resources  for  the  Community. 
38.  This  proposal  of  the  Commission  has  been  on 
the  table  of  the  Council  for  almost  ten  years.  It 
clearly  raises  issues  of  considerable  domestic  sensi-
tivity  in  some  Member  States.  Nonetheless,  the 
Commission  maintains  its  view  that  if the  Community 
is  to  develop  as  a  viable  political  and  economic 
entity,  its  institutions  must  have  some  greater 
degree  of  independence  in  their  revenue  raising 
powers.  Whatever  new  sources  of  revenue  are  created, 
they  should  be  of  such  a  kind  as  to  sustain  the 
development  of  the  Community  for  a  secure  period 
of  time,  without  the  automatic  requirement  for 
national  ratification  procedures.  The  Commission 
would  not,  for  example,  wish  to  see  the  1%  VAT 
ceiling  replaced  simply  by  a  new  ceiling  so  low 
that  it  too  would  soon  be  reached. 
39.  It  is  not  in  the  context  of  the  present  green 
paper  that  the  Commission  wants  to  take  a  position 
on  ways  in  which  Parliament's  powers  in  the  annual 
budgetary  procedure  can  be  brought  up  to  date. 
However,  the  Commission  is  aware  of  the  potential 
relationship  between  decisions  concerning  revenues - 24  -
and  those  concerning  expenditure.  It  is  taking  note 
of  the  work  which  has  started  within  Parliament 
on  the  way  the  budgetary  procedure  could  be  improved 
for  expenditure  as  well  as  revenues.  The  manner 
in  which  the  Commission  will  put  forward  its 
proposals  on  developing  the  Community's  financing 
system,  i.e.  the  presentation,  first  of  this  consulta-
tive  document,  has  been  chosen  in  part  so  as  to 
enable  the  Commission  to  take  due  account  of  Parlia-
ment's  views.  The  Commission  would  wish  to  associate 
Parliament  as  closely  as  possible  with  the  further 
refinement  of  its  ideas.  The  Commission  envisages 
that  these  ideas  will  in  any  event  be  a  subject 
for  the  conciliation  procedure  between  the  institu-
tions. 
*  *  *  *  * • 
- -----~------
ANNEX  I  (2SJ 
FORMS  OF  REVENUE  WHICH  DO  NOT  SEEM,  IN  PRESENT  CIRCUMSTANCES,  TO  BE 
FEASIBLE  AS  COMMUNITY  RESOURCES 
1.  Excise  Duties 
The  Commission  does  not  consider  that  excise duties  on  cigarettes 
or  alcohol  would  be  a  suitable  source  of  revenue  for  the  Community. 
They  would  not  facilitate the  realisation of  any  Community  policy. 
For  alcohol  excises,  there  is  the additional  problem  of  the  Lack 
of  harmonisation  of  duties  on  beer,  wine  and  spirits  where  the 
Commission's  proposals  have  not  yet  resulted  in  a  Council  decision. 
2.  Corporation  Tax 
The  Commission  has  Long  advocated  the  harmonisation  of  corporation 
taxes.  For  Community  involvement  in  the  taxation  of  corporations, 
three  hypotheses  could  be  considered: 
the  replacement  of  national  corporation  tax  systems  by  a  Community 
tax  administered directly  by  the  Community; 
allocation to  the  Community·  budget  of  part  of  the  yield  of 
national  corporation  taxes; 
the  introduction of  new  taxes  on  companies  earmarked  for  the 
specific  purpose  of  financing  certain expenditure  from  which 
companies  benefit  particularly in  the  research  sector. 
At  this  stage,  it appears  that  corporation  tax  is  not  a  suitable 
source  of  Community  finance  in  the  near  future.  This  would 
be  practical  only  in  the  Long  term  since  it  would - 2  -
require  a  uniform  base  on  which  the  tax  could  be  imposed.  Such 
harmonisation  will  be  extremely  complex  and  so  take  a  considerable 
amount  of  time.  The  Commission  is  engaged  on  the  necessary pre-
paratory  work  but  would  find  it difficult  to  present  a  formal 
proposal  until  the  Parliament  has  given  an  opinion  on  the  Com-
mission's  1975  proposal  on  Harmonisation  of  Systems  of  Company 
Taxation.  The  Parliament  gave  an  interim opinion  in  1979  but  has 
not  returned  to  the  issue. 
The  third  hypothesis  is  dealt  with  in  paragraph  26  of  the  main 
text. 
3.  Income  Tax 
The  use  of  personal  income  tax,  the  only  real  progressive  tax  as 
an  own  resource  would  depend  on  at  Least  the  following  conditions 
being  met: 
harmonisation  of  its  scope,  that  is  definition of  the  natural 
and  Legal  persons  to  be  taxed; 
harmonisation  of  the  base  which  requires  common  rules  to  determine 
personal  income,  not  just  of  individuals,  but  also  of  industrial 
and  commercial  firms  and  agricultural  enterprises  not  subject  to 
co~poration tax. 
The  complexity  of  this  harmonisation  and  its political  implications 
probably  mean  that  action  is  unlikely  to  be  taken  in  the  foreseeable 
future  in  this  field. 
4.  Taxation  of  hydrocarbons 
The  benefit  of  a  tax  on  hydrocarbons  must  be  assessed  in  a  general 
economic  and  political  context.  In  the  event  of  a  future  decline 
in  world  market  prices  of oil,  some  fiscal  intervention  might  be - 3  -
appropriate  on  these  grounds.  The  Commission,  in  its  communication 
COM(81)  555,  has  put  the  main  emphasis  on  the  coordination of 
national  tax  policies  in  relation to  the  Community's  economic  and 
energy  policies.  Although  it is possible that,  in  addition  to 
such  national  coordination,  the  imposition of  a  specific  Community 
tax  might  merit  further  study, such  a  tax,  even  if  introduced,  could  not 
be  expected  to yield  significant  amounts  of  revenue. 
'  ( ?7) ANNEX  II 
FINANCIAL  EQUALISATION 
In  the  light  of  the  suggestions  often  made  (particularly  in  the 
context  of  the  Lange  Resolution  of  November  1979)  for  the 
introduction  of  financial  equalisation arrangements  in the 
Community  financing  system,  the  Commission  has  thought  it useful 
to set  out  briefly: 
what  is meant  by  financial  equalisation  and  what  is its purpose; 
how  financial  equalisation operates  in  certain existing federal 
systems,  notably  Switzerland  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany; 
what  conclusions  might  be  drawn  for  the  Community  from  the 
operation  of  these  financial  equalisation arrangements. 
Financial  equalisation  in  the strict  sense  means  a  systematic 
process  of  financial  transfers  directed  towards  the  equalisation 
of  the  budget  capacity  or  economic  performance  of  different  levels 
of  federal  governments.  A purpose  of  such  equalisation  is  to 
enable  states  to  ensure  the  provision  of  a  comparable  range  and 
quality  of  public  services  for  their  citizens  while  maintaining 
broadly  comparable  fiscal  burdens  in  the  form  of  standard  rates 
of  taxation  and  other  charges. 
Financial  equalisation  systems  exist  in practice  in  all  major 
western  federations:  Germany,  Switzerland,  Austria,  the  United 
States,  Canada  and  Australia.  They  are  of  broadly  two  types: 
horizontal  systems  where  the  equalisation takes  place  between 
the  various  subsidiary  Levels  of  government;  and  vertical 
systems  where  it takes  place  through  the  fiscal  activities  and 
powers  of  the  central  government.  Equalisation  systems  normally 
have  two  elements:  general  purpose  equalisation  on  the  revenue 
side  and  a  specific  purpose  grant  system  (e.g.  for  social  services, 
health,  education  or  transport)  on  the  expenditure  side.  The - 2  -
precise  mix  and  scope  of  the  system  varies  considerably  from  one 
federation  to  another.  But  problems  may  arise  when  general  and 
specific  purpose  equalisation  payments  are  made  in  conjunction: 
the  effect  of  one  form  of  payment  may  in  some  circumstances 
either duplicate  or  be  incompatible  with  the  effect  of  the other. 
In  Switzerland,  there  exists  a  system  of  vertical  financial 
equalisation.  Subsidiary authorities  Cin  this  case  the  cantons) 
receive  varying  payments  from  the  Confederation  in  accordance  with  speci-
ficallydefined  needs.  The  cantons  have  a  direct  share  in  the 
Confederations's  revenue  (where  revenue  equalisation operates) 
and  in  its expenditure,  in  the  form  of  federal  grants  (where 
expenditure equalisation applies). 
Revenue  equalisation  coversthenumber  of  taxes  recorded  in  the 
Swiss  constitution  which  the  Confederation  has  to  share  with  the 
cantons.  The  shares  which  the  Conf2deration  and  the  cantons  as 
a  whole  receive  from  each  source  of  taxation are  Laid  down  by  the 
constitution.  Revenue  equalisation applies  only  to  the distribution 
of  the  cantons'  share  between  the  individual  cantons.  Different 
scales  of  apportionment  are  Laid  down  for  each  tax.  The  bulk  of 
tax  revenue  is divided  up  in  proportion  to  the  canton's  population 
(though  its defence  tax  capacity  is  also  taken  into  account). 
No  conditions  are  imposed  on  how  the  cantons  may  use  the  funds 
received  from  federal  taxes  (though  conditions  are  attached  to 
the  use  of  the  separate  Federal  expenditure  grants  to  which  the 
cantons  are  required  to  make  a  contribution of  their  own). 
Equalisation  on  the  expenditure  side  applies,  in  that  the  cantons 
are  granted  varying  rates  of  aid.  The  Confederation's  percentage 
contribution  to  the  canton's  programmes  or  projects  is  mainly 
based  on  its  fiscal  capacity  index.  This  index,  mainly  based  on 
tax  burden,  taxable  capacity,  size  of  population  and  geographical/ - 3  -
regional  factors~ gives  each  canton  a  rating  on  the  basis  of  which 
its  requirements  for  additional  funds  in  relation  to  those  of  the 
other  cantons  are  assessed. 
The  Swiss  system  of  equalisation  avoids  direct  payments  from  one 
canton  to another.  Financial  equalisation operations are  always 
conducted  centrally  and  are  based  on  criteria which  take  into 
account  the  financial  requirements  and  fiscal  capacity  of  the 
cantons.  This  gives  greater  protection  for  the  cantons'  fiscal 
independence  than  would  a  horizontal  system  of  financial  equali-
sation.  But  the  corollary of  this  greater  independence  is  a 
wider  range  of  discrepancy  between  the  cantons  in  the  provision 
of  public  welfare  services. 
In  Germany,  in  addition  to  a  vertical  equalisation  arrangement 
through  the  VAT  sharing  system  which  increases  the  tax  capacity 
of  each  'Land'  to  a  level  of  92%  of  the  average,  there  is  a 
horizontal  system  of  inter-land equalisation.  The  German  'Lander-
finanzausgleich'  is  unique  in  the  world  in  that  it provides  for 
horizontal  payments  from  fiscally  rich to fiscally  poor  states 
without  affecting  the  federal  budget.  It  has  been  created  in 
special  post  second  world  war  circumstances  where  a  particularly 
high  degree  of  solidarity between  the  'Lander'  was  required  in 
order  to  cope  with  the  problem  of  rebuilding  the  German  economy 
and  absorbing  the  refugees  from  the  Lost  territories. 
The  'Landerfinanzausgleich'  is  designed  to  ensure  that  a  below 
average  'Land'  always  reaches  95%  of  the  per  capita  average  tax 
receipts  of  all  'Lander'  and  that  a  'Land'  required  to make 
equalisation transfers  does  not,  as  a  result,  fall  below  100%  of 
the  average.  The  level  of  equalisation  contributions/grants  is 
determined  by  the  relationship  between  a  tax  capacity  indicator 
('Steuerkraftmesszahl')  and  an  expenditure  need  indicator 
('Ausgleichsmesszahl'). - 4  -
The  'Landerfinanzausgleich'  is  part  of  a  more  general  financial 
equalisation  between  the  'Lander'.  On  the  revenue  side,  in 
addition  to  the  VAT  sharing  system  additional  payments  ('Erganzungs-
zuweisungen')  are  made  by  the  'Bund'  to  the  less  prosperous  'Lander'. 
Finally,  on  the  expenditure  side,  a  system  of  specific  purpose 
grants  exists  in the  areas  of  university  and  hospital  construction, 
regional  policy,  agricultural  structural  policy,  coastal  protection, 
urban  development,  etc. 
In  view  of  the  special  circumstances  which  led  to the  horizontal 
German  'Finanzausgleich'  and  the fact  that  this  is  operated  outside 
the  federal  budget  ,  it  can  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  appropriate 
model  for  a  new  Community  system. 
Some  kind  of  vertical  system  might  seem  more  promising  as  a  possible 
model  for  the  Community.  Nevertheless  a  number  of  preconditions 
would  need  to  be  fulfilled:  first,  the  Community  would  have  to  have 
the  necessary  budgetary  means  at  its disposal  for  making  any 
equalisation  payments.  At  the  moment,  when  the  Community  is  not  a 
federal  state and  because  its powers  are  limited,  its budget,  in 
contrast  to  the  budget  of  federal  states,  is  smaller  than  the  budgets 
of  its  constituent  members  and  the  scope  for  financial  equalisation 
is  consequently  restricted  from  the  outset.  Secondly,  an  agreed 
overall  political  aim  and  objective method  for  calculating  the 
equalisation  payments  would  have  to  be  set  up  and  it  would  need  to 
(:, i) 
be  geared  to  the  objective  of  convergence.  Finally,  an  effective 
monitoring  in  respect  of  this objective  would  have  to  be  put  into place. - 5  - (  ~  ~-) 
The  Lange  Resolution  calls for  a  "new  and  Lasting  system  of  financial 
equalisation  between  the  Member  States  within  a  Community  framework 
- based  on  the  concept  of  per  capita  GDP  and  organised  within  the 
framework  of  the  Community  Budget".  This  would  imply  not  a  full 
fiscal  equalisation  system  as  practised  in existing  Federal  states, 
but  a  more  Limited  mechanism  geared  towards  partial  economic  equali-
sation  or  transfers. 
The  existing  Community  structural  funds  (particularly  the  Regional 
and  Social  Funds)  already  constitute  a  first  step  in  this  respect. 
But  it  would  of  course  be  possible  to develop  the  idea  of  resource 
transfers  further  and  to  introduce  a  more  far-reaching  transfer 
mechanism  expenditure  into  the  Community  Budget. 
Such  a  mechanism,  Linked  to  the  aim  of  economic  convergence,  would 
however  need  to  be  geared  to  the  following  considerations: 
- the  revenue  raising  capacity; 
- identifying  the  public  finance  functions  for  which  a  need 
for  resource  transfers  exists  at  the  Level  of  the  Community; 
- in  respect  of  the  selected  functions 
•  the  measurement  of  expenditure  needs 
•  the  degree  of  transfer appropriate - 6  -
The  political  and  technical  complexities  involved  in  this  should 
not  be  under-estimated.  In  existing federations,  equalisation 
systems  have  evolved  over  a  Long  period  of  time  and  have  a  well-
established tradition.  The  Community  is  however  more  heterogeneous 
in  economic  capacities,  policies  and  traditions  than  existing 
federations.  It  is  probably  unrealistic  therefore  to  envisage 
at  this  stage  more  than  a  modest  step  in  this  direr.tion,  perhaps 
by  the  introduction  in  complement  to  the  existing structural 
funds  of  a  special  fund  geared  either  to  the  provision  of  additional 
finance  for  activities  reflecting particular  Community  priorities 
or  Limited  in  application  to  the  Community's  Least  prosperous 
Member  States. ANNEX  III 
THE  GLOBALITY  AND  AUTONOMY  OF  THE  COMMUNITY'S  BUDGET 
I  ', 
·2u' 
j  i) 
In  addition  to  the  Community's  general  budget,  two  other  budgets 
exist  through  which  expenditure  on  Community  policies  is 
disbursed,  namely  the  European  Development  Fund  a~d the  oper-
ational  budget  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community.  For 
both  of  these  separate  budgets  there  are  different  financing 
arrangements.  The  EDF  is  financed  by  special  contributions  by 
Member  States  calculated  according  to a  political  key.  The  ECSC 
operational  budget  is  financed  mainly  by  a  production  Levy  on 
coal  and  steel  enterprises  (although  in  recent  years  special 
contributions  from  Member  States  or  from  the  general  budget  have 
also  been  made). 
The  existence  of  sources  of  finance  for  Community  expenditure 
outside  the  general  budget  is  at  variance  with  the  principle 
of  the  unity  of  the  budget  and  has  been  criticised  by  the 
European  Parliament.  As  regards  the  European  Development  Fund, 
the  Commission  is  committed  to  supporting  its full  budgetisation 
and  is  proceeding  on  the  presumption  that  the  successor  to the 
Lome  Convention,  which  will  enter  into  force  in  1985,  will  be  so 
budgetised.  In  addition  to  the  issue  of  principle,  there  are 
practical  advantages  to  this.  The  distinction  between  associated 
and  non-associated  developing  countries  can  no  longer  be  rigidly 
applied  in  the  budgetary  field.  Programmes  covering  both  sorts 
of  countries  have  already  been  proposed  by  the  Commission  under 
the  general  budget  despite  the  separate  existence  of  the  EDF. - 2  -
As  regards  the  ECSC,  however,  the  Commission  remains  sceptical 
about  the  advantages  of  incorporating  its budget  into  the 
general  budget.  The  reasons  Lie  in  the  separate  juridical 
existence  of  the  Paris  Treaty  and  the  particular  character-
istics  of  the  ECSC  Budget,  for  example  its role  in  support 
of  borrowing  and  Lending  and  the direct  relationship  which  it 
embodies  between  sources  of  revenue  and  areas  of  expenditure. 
Nonetheless,  it  seems  Likely  that  the  demands  of  Community 
expenditure  in  certain  ECSC  areas,  particularly  the  steel 
social  field,  will  be  so  acute  over  the  next  few  years  that 
the  ECSC  Budget  will  be  unable  to  cope  with  them.  This  means 
either  that  the  ECSC  Budget  will  need  to  be  supplemented 
significantly  by  revenue  from  the  General  Budget  or  from  Member 
States;  or  that  certain types  of  expenditure  in  the  social  and 
other fields,  hitherto falling  under  the  aegis  of  the  ECSC 
Budget,  will  need  in the  future  to  be  implemented  through  the 
general  budget. 
There  is  in  any  event  one  further  anomaly  in  the  current  ECSC 
and  Community  Budget  arrangements  which  in  the  Commission's 
view  ought  to  be  speedily  rectified.  Customs  duties  on  ECSC 
products  are  not  paid  over  Like  other  customs  duties  to  the 
Community,  but  are  retained  by  the  Member  States.  They  amount 
currently  to  around  50  MECU  per  year.  The  Commission  and  the 
Parliament  have  for  some  time  urged  the  transfer  of  these  duties 
to  the  Community,  but  the  Council  has  not  so  far  agreed. 
As  regards  the  financial  autonomy  of  the  Community,  there  are 
a  number  of  areas  where  the  Community 1s  current  powers  over  its 
own  resources  are  severely  restricted  and  where  the  removal  of  such 
restrictions  would constitutea logical strengthening ofthe Community's 
(~S) 1 
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present  competence.  The  first  set  of  restrictions  concerns  the 
availability of  own  resources  and  other  revenue  derived  from  Member 
States.  The  Community  does  not  in  practice  freely dispose  of  such 
revenues  at  the  present  time.  They  are  not  placed  unconditionally 
and  definitively at  the  disposition  of  the  Community  but  may  only 
be  withdrawn  from  the  accounts  with  the  Member  States'  treasuries 
to  the  extent  necessary  to  cover  cash  resource  requirements  arising 
out  of  the  implementation  of  the  Budget.  These  accounts  bear  no 
interest  and  the  Commission  is  prevented  from  depositing  the  funds 
in  them  in  interest  bearing  accounts.  Moreover,  any  balance  between 
actual  income  and  expenditure  at  the  end  of  the  year  is  not  retained 
by  the  Community  but  must  instead  be  entered  in  an  amending  budget 
of  the  following  year:  the  balance  is  thus  in  effect  returned  to 
the  Member  States. 
Similarly,  when  Member  States  send  to  the  Commission  the  statements 
of  their  VAT  bases  for  the  preceding  year,  and  pay  or  are  refunded 
the  difference  between  the  actual  amounts  due  and  the  provisional 
amounts  made  over,  these  payments  or  refunds  are  immediately 
entered  in  an  amending  budget. 
This  situation  reflects  the  system  whereby  the  budget  was  financed 
entirely  by  financial  contributions  from  Member  States,  not  a  system 
of  true  Community  own  resources.  Removal  of  the  restrictions  in 
question  would  be  relatively easy,  as  they  are  contained  in  regu-
Lations  and  their  modification  would  not  therefore  require  ratification 
by  Member  States'  Parliaments.  The  Commission  has  already  submitted 
proposals  of  a  Limited  nature  to  improve  the  situation.  In  its 
suggested  modifications  to  the  Financial  Regulation  it  proposed - 4  -
that  the  balance  of  a  budget  year  could  be  kept  for  a  full  further 
year  before  being  entered  in  an  amending  budget.  And  in  its pro-
posals  for  amending  Council  regulation  number  2891/77  implementing 
the  decision  of  21  April  1970,  it  proposed  that  the  Commission's 
accounts  with  Member  States'  treasuries  be  interest  bearing. 
A further  budgetary  innovation  which,  in  the  Commission's  view, 
merits  study,  relates  to  unused  FEOGA  Guarantee  appropriations. 
In  the  Commission's  opinion  such  unused  appropriations,  which 
because  of  the  volatile  and  unpredictable  nature  of  agricultural 
expenditure  are  bound  occasionally to  occur,  could  appropriately 
be  placed,  either  in  full  or  in  part,  in  a  reserve  which  could 
be  used  to  cover  additional  FEOGA  Guarantee  financial  needs  in 
a  future  year. 
(3~7) 